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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction for the Court of Appeals is conferred statutorily 
by U.C.A. 77-35-26 and Rule 26 Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
which gives the Utah Court of Appeals jurisdiction over appeals 
from final judgments in the Seventh Judicial District Court. 
STATEMENT OF TSCTIKSS 
1. The issue before the court is whether error was committed 
by the District Court when it dismissed Petitioner's Petition for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus and Post Conviction Relief based upon the 
ninety day statute of limitations when there were extraordinary 
circumstances which prohibited the Petitioner from filing his 
petition within the ninety day statute of limitations. 
Standard of Review: Correctness of the trial court's 
ruling, and no particular deference should be given to the court's 
conclusion. Henretty v. Manti City Corp.. 791 P.2d 506 (Utah 
1990), Scharf v. B.M.G. Corp., 700 P. 2d 1068 (Utah 1985), 
Transamerica Cash Reserve v. Dixie Power, 789 P.2d 24 (Utah 1990)# 
a n d
 Automotive Mfrs. , etc. v. Serv. Auto Parts, Inc.
 f 596 P.2d 1033 
(Utah 1979). 
2. Whether the ninety day statute of limitations for filing 
a Writ of Habeas Corpus is unconstitutional because it is a statute 
of limitations and not a procedural limitation. 
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Standard of Review; Correctness of the trial court's 
ruling, and no particular deference should be given to the court's 
conclusion. Henretty v. Manti City Corp.. 791 P.2d 506 (Utah 
1990), Scharf v. B.M.G. Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985), 
Transamerica Cash Reserve v. Dixie Powerr 789 P. 2d 24 (Utah 1990), 
and Automotive Mfrs. , etc. v. Serv. Auto Parts. Inc.. 596 P.2d 1033 
(Utah 1979). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION. STATUTES 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 4; (See Addendum E) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 65B(b); (See Addendum F) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 78-12-31.1, (See Addendum G) 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The Appellant filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and 
Post Conviction Relief on the 16th day of April, 1992. Assistant 
Attorney General, David Bryant, filed a Motion To Dismiss and 
Memorandum in Support of Motion To Dismiss the Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus on the 30th day of April, 1992. The Motion To 
Dismiss was based upon the ninety day statute of limitations set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. 78-12-31.1, which bars any Petition for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus not filed within a ninety day period from the 
date that the cause of action accrued. 
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The Appellant filed a Motion For Extension of Time with the 
District Court on the 19th day of May, 1992. The District Court 
granted said extension on the 28th day of May, 1992. 
The Appellant filed an Objection and Request For Hearing on 
the 5th day of June, 1992, wherein, he specifically stated why the 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Post Conviction Relief 
should not be barred by the ninety day statute of limitations. The 
Memorandum in Response to the Petitioner's Objection was filed on 
the 10th day of June, 1992. 
The District Court granted the Attorney General's Motion To 
Dismiss on the 12th day of June, 1992, and the final Order was 
entered therein on the 22nd day of June, 1992. The Appellant's 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Post Conviction Relief was 
based upon the theory of ineffective assistance of counsel at the 
time of Petitioner's plea agreement in his criminal case and at the 
time of sentencing. The Appellant's Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus was also based upon an affidavit which he had obtained from 
a co-defendant who had been an adverse witness against the 
Petitioner and for the state in his associated criminal 
prosecution. Said affidavit rescinded an incriminating statement 
which had been previously made by said co-defendant. 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Petitioner was charged with a First Degree Felony in 1989. As 
a result of wrongful and undue pressure on the part of Petitioner's 
defense counsel, Petitioner entered into a plea agreement whereby 
he plead guilty to a Second Degree Felony and another Misdemeanor 
charge was dropped. Subsequentlyf Petitioner brought two motions 
to withdraw his guilty plea, during which his counsel admitted that 
he had applied undue and wrongful pressure upon the Petitioner in 
order to convince him to plead guilty. The motions were denied. 
An Appeal was filed on the denial of the motions to withdraw his 
guilty plea. However, Petitioner was convinced by his counsel to 
withdraw the appeal based upon counsel's representing that if the 
Petitioner dropped the appeal and refrained from any legal action 
against his counsel, he would arrange for Petitioner's release from 
a term of six months in the county jail that he was serving 
pursuant to probation and suspended sentence. Petitioner was soon 
thereafter released from the county jail and remained on probation 
until such time as he tested positive for use of a controlled 
substance and his probation was then revoked. A significant factor 
in Petitioner's decision to plead guilty was the information that 
a co-defendant in the criminal matter had provided damaging 
testimony against the Petitioner. 
On or about October 28, 1991, wherein, Mr. Marquez recanted 
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the damaging testimony he had previously given against the 
Petitioner. About two weeks later Petitioner received an affidavit 
which was signed by said co-defendant, Raymond Marquez. Petitioner 
soon thereafter met with the contract attorneys at the Utah State 
Prison to obtain assistance in filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus concerning the withdrawal of his guilty plea. On December 
16, 1991, the contract attorneys received from the Petitioner an 
edited rough draft of his Habeas Corpus for revisions. Immediately 
thereafter Mr. Currier was transferred to the San Juan County Jail. 
On or about January 6, 1992, the contract attorneys received 
from Mr. Currier a letter indicating that he had been transferred 
to the County Jail and on that same date a memo and revised 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus along with the Petitioner's 
transcripts were sent to him at the San Juan County Jail. 
nAccompanying said documents was a memo from the contract attorneys 
that stated that since he had been transferred to the San Juan 
County Jail, which was out of the contract attorneys jurisdiction, 
they were unable to help him with anymore services and he was 
advised to contact the contract attorney for that area. Upon 
arrival at the San Juan County Jail the Petitioner requested to see 
the San Juan County Jail contract attorney, but was not able to see 
him until approximately five weeks later. 
On or about March 20, 1992, Mr. Currier was transferred back 
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to the Utah State Prison at which time he gave to the contract 
attorneys his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and exhibits in 
order to file them with the court. On March 25, 1992, the original 
and three copies of Mr. Currier's Petition, Exhibits and 
accompanying documents were sent to him at the Utah State Prison 
for his signature and were subsequently filed on or about April 10, 
1992. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Utah's ninety day statute of limitations is 
unconstitutional because ninety days is not a reasonable 
period of time in which to file for relief. 
II. The ninety day statute of limitations is unconstitutional 
because it is a statute of limitations and not a 
procedural limitation. 
III. Utah's statute of limitations is unconstitutional because 
it contains no provision for excusable delay. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
UTAH'S NINETY DAY STATUTE OP T.TMTTATIONS ON THE 
FILING OF A WRIT HABEAS CORPUS IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
The Petitioner acknowledges that the state may apply 
procedural limitations on the filing of Petitions for Writs of 
Habeas Corpus. However, the Petitioner contends that, in order for 
that procedural limitation to be Constitutional, it must be 
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reasonable and that a ninety day statute of limitations is not 
reasonable. The Petitioner's only access to legal materials, while 
at the prison, is through the contract attorneys. Said contract 
attorneys have a limited contract which only enables them to assist 
nthe inmates in preparing their initial pleadings for Petitions for 
Writs of Habeas Corpus. Because the contract attorneys do not 
actually represent the inmates, it is often required that the 
inmate obtain his own documentation in order to prepare the 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. In the Petitioner's case, he 
had virtually no copies of any of his court file and consequently, 
was required to obtain documents, such as his commitment order and 
plea agreement, etc., through means such as writing letters to the 
court and contacting his case worker there at the prison. All of 
this took a considerable period of time which rendered virtually 
impossible the timely preparation of his Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus. Also, the Petitioner had no legal training 
whatsoever. When he was transferred to the jurisdiction of another 
attorney and had difficulty contacting that attorney, he had no 
idea how to complete and file his Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus within the ninety day period. Petitioner, being an inmate 
at the Utah State Prison, was precluded by policy and procedure of 
said prison from communicating directly with the co-defendant 
Marquez. Any such communication with said defendant needed to 
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occur through the intersession of third parties, which also took a 
considerable amount of time. The ninety days simply was not an 
adequate period of time in which the Petitioner could have filed 
his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
Utah's ninety day statute of limitations is the most 
restrictive in the nation. Many states do not even have a statute 
of limitation on Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Of those 
states which do have a statute of limitation on Petitions for Writs 
of Habeas Corpus, all of them well exceed ninety days. Idaho has 
a five year statute of limitation on Petitions for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus. Mellinaer vs. State. 740 P.2d 73 (Idaho App. 1987); 
Housley vs. State. 811 P.2d 495 (Idaho App. 1991). Montana has a 
five year statute of limitation on Petitions for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus. State vs. Perry. 758 P.2d 268 (Mont. 1988). Colorado has 
a three year statute of limitations. People vs. Germany. 674 P.2d 
345, 350, (Colo. 1983). Wyoming has a five year statute of 
limitations to bring an action under the post-conviction act. See 
Albert vs. State. 466 P.2d 826 (Wyo. 1970). Illinois has a five 
year statute of limitations. See People vs. Beamon. 333 N.E.2d 575 
(111. App. 1975). Mississippi has a three year statute of 
limitations. Perkins vs. State. 487 So.2d 791 (Miss. 1986). 
Patterson vs. Statef 594 So.2d 606 (Miss. 1992). Alabama has a two 
year statute of limitations. Dukes vs. State. 587 S.2d 1065 
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(Ala.Cr.App. 1991). Iowa has a two year statute of limitations on 
Petitions for Writs of Habeas Corpus. Davis vs. State, 443 N.W.2d 
707 (Iowa 1989). Other than Utah, the most restrictive statute of 
limitations on a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus which the 
Petitioner could find is that of 120 days in the State of Oregon. 
See Bartz vs. State, 110 Or.App. 613, 825 P.2d 657, (Or. App. 
1992). However, Petitioner is not aware of any Oregon Court 
dealing with the reasonableness of the 120 day period because that 
was not an issue which has come before it. 
Some of the justices in the Utah Supreme Court believe that 
the ninety day statute of limitations on a Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus is unconstitutional. In the concurring and 
dissenting opinion of Justice Zimmerman in Smith vs. Cook, 803 P.2d 
788, 796 (Utah 1990), Justice Zimmerman stated as follows: 
WI concur in the result in part I of the Chief 
Justice's opinion, because I do not think the 
legislature can validly impose a 3 month 
limitation on habeas corpus actions." See 
Utah Constitution Article I Section V(ll); See 
also, Condermarin vs. University Hosp.f 775 
P.2d 348, 366-69 (Utah 1989), (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring in part); Berry vs. Beech Aircraft 
Corp.. 717 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 1985). 
Justice Stewart, concurred in the concurring and dissenting 
opinion of Justice Zimmerman as well. It is also interesting to 
note that Chief Justice Howe who delivered the opinion in Smith vs. 
Cook, specifically stated that, "Since we have resolved this issue 
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on statutory grounds, we will not reach Smith's constitutional 
arguments". Smith vs. Cook, at 791. The Utah Legislature may 
impose a limitation on the filing of a Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus, but in order for it to be constitutional and not impose on 
the Petitioner's protected Due Process rights it must be much more 
reasonable than ninety days. 
II 
THE NINETY DAY STATUTE OF T.TMTTATIONS IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
BECAUSE IT IS A STATUTE OF T.TMTTATIONS AND NOT A 
PttnrarareAT. T.TMITATION. 
In State vs. Fowler, 752 P.2d 497 (Ariz.App. 1987), the 
Arizona Court of Appeals ruled that a one year statute of 
limitations imposed upon the commencement of a post conviction 
relief action was unconstitutional because it conflicted with the 
Arizona Supreme Court's power to make procedural rules which was 
vested in it by the Arizona Constitution. In that case the Arizona 
Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically stated that a Petition for 
Post Conviction Relief could be filed at any time, however, the 
Arizona Legislature passed a statute which stated that any post 
conviction relief petition must be filed within a one year period 
of time. In Arizona, as in Utah, the State Supreme Court is vested 
exclusively with the power to make procedural rules. Id. at 500. 
Consequently, any law which the Legislature enacts which infringes 
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upon the State Supreme Court's procedural powers is 
unconstitutional. 
1. To Be Constitutional The Limitation Must Be Procedural In 
Nature. 
In State vs. Fowler, Id., the court distinguished between a 
statute of limitations and a procedural limitation. The court 
pointed out that statute of limitations in the criminal context are 
considered acts of grace or a surrendering by the sovereign of its 
right to prosecute. State vs. Fowler, at 500. The court also 
explained that statute of limitations, 
M
...create a bar to prosecution and are 
therefore not merely statute of repose as they 
are in civil cases. A criminal statute of 
limitations is not a mere limitation upon the 
remedy but one upon the power of the sovereign 
to act against the accused." 
State vs. Fowler, at 500. 
Consequently# as pointed out by the Arizona Court of Appeals 
"in criminal law a statute of limitations deals only with the right 
to commence a criminal case. Time limits prescribed for steps to 
be taken subsequent to the commencement of a case are not statutes 
of limitations." State vs. Fowler, at 500. Such limitations are 
procedural in nature and are regulated by the courts, not the 
legislature. 
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2. The Utah Supreme Court Has Imposed No Procedural 
Limitation On The Filing Of A Petition For Writ Of Habeas 
Corpus, 
In Utah# the rules of civil or criminal procedure do not 
specifically state a procedural limitation on the filing of a 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus or for Post Conviction Relief. 
In Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 65B(b), it states as follows: 
(1) Any person imprisoned in the penitentiary 
or county jail under a commitment of any court 
whether such imprisonment be under an original 
commitment or under a commitment for violation 
of probation or parole, who asserts that in 
any proceedings which resulted in his 
commitment there was a substantial denial of 
his rights under the Constitution of the 
United States or of the State of Utah, or 
both, may institute a proceeding under this 
rule. 
Such proceeding may be commenced by filing a 
complaint together with a copy thereof with 
the clerk of the court in which such relief is 
sought." 
The Utah Supreme Court has not placed a procedural limitation 
on the filing of the Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus or 
Petitions for Post Conviction Relief. 
The Utah Constitution specifically states in Article VIII, 
Section 4, as follows: 
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of 
procedure and evidence to be used in the 
courts of the state and shall by rule manage 
the appellate process. 
Thus# if a procedural limitation of ninety days were to be 
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constitutionally imposed upon the filing of the Petition for Writ 
of Habeas Corpus, it would have to be done by the Utah Supreme 
Court and not by a Legislative enactment. 
Ill 
UTAH'S STATUTE OF T.TMTTATIQN IS UNCONSTITDTIONAL 
BECAUSE IT CONTAINS NO PROVISION FOR EXCUSABLE DELAY 
In order for the Utah ninety day statute of limitations on the 
filing of a Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus to be reasonable and 
thus, constitutional, it must contain provisions for relief from 
being time barred when evidence of excusable delay is presented. In 
Passainisi vs. Director, Nevada Department of Prisons, 769 P.2d 72, 
74, (Nev. 1989), the court ruled that the Nevada statute of 
limitations was reasonable, "...especially because the requirement 
could be waived by showing a prejudice and good cause for failure 
to meet the one year time period." In Albert vs. State. 466 P.2d 
826 (Wyo. 1970), where the state has a five year statute of 
limitations, the court looked at the issue of whether the 
Petitioner's missing of the deadline was due to his own neglect or 
excusable delay. It specifically found no evidence in the record 
tending to excuse the delay. In fact the Wyoming state statute 
containing the five year statute of limitations specifically states 
that the petitioner may obtain relief from the statute of 
limitations if he can show facts that indicate that the delay was 
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not due to his own neglect. 
In People vs. Germany
 f 674 P.2d 345, 350 (Colo. 1983), 
Colorado held that its statute of limitation for collateral attack 
on criminal convictions violated due process by precluding 
challenges to convictions solely on the basis of a time bar without 
providing the defendant any opportunity to show justifiable excuse. 
In Davis vs. State, 443 N.W.2d 707, 710, the Supreme Court of 
Iowa held that imposition of its statute of limitations was also 
subject to the right of the Petitioner to raise the issue of 
justifiable excuse for delay. Even in the more restrictive State 
of Oregon, the court specifically addresses the issue of whether or 
not the Petitioner presented any evidence of his failure to comply 
with the 120 day statute of limitations because he was prevented or 
dissuaded from examining the issues in the Petitioner's Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus. See Bartz vs. State. 110 Or.App. 613, 
825 P.2d 657 (Or.App. 1992). 
In all of the states researched by Petitioner the petitioner 
has the right or the opportunity to raise the issue of whether or 
not his failure to comply with the statute of limitations was due 
to his own neglect or due to circumstances beyond his control. 
Since the Utah statute of limitations provides for no such 
exception to the filing of a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 
then it is an unreasonable violation of the Petitioner's Due 
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Process rights and is consequently unconstitutional. 
The Petitioner in this case missed the statute of limitations 
nor filing his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by only a few 
days. The reason for such failure was the fact that the Petitioner 
was not able to accumulate his evidence and prepare his Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus within ninety days. Ninety days was 
simply too short a time for the Petitioner to prepare a Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus due to the limited legal resources which 
were available to him in the prison. 
CONCLUSIONS CONTAINING STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Because the Utah ninety day statute limitations on the filing 
of a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus or for Post Conviction 
Relief is so restrictive in nature it is unconstitutional. In 
order for a restriction on the time period for filing a Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus or Post Conviction Relief to be limited 
such limitations must be a procedural limitation imposed by the 
Utah Supreme Court which is not the case in Utah. The ninety days 
permitted for filing Petitions for Writs of Habeas Corpus and for 
Post Conviction Relief by the statute of limitations is much to 
restrictive of period and is consecjuently unreasonable, cmd 
thereby, unconstitutional. In order for even a procedural 
limitation on the filing of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus or 
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Post Conviction Relief to be constitutional it must have some 
provision for excusable delay when the filing deadline has been 
missed. 
For the above described reasons the Appellant respectfully 
request that the court rule that the ninety day statute of 
limitation found at Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 is unconstitutional 
and thus unenforceable, and to remand the Appellant's case to the 
District Court within instructions that Appellant's Petition for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus be heard. 
Therefore, the Petitioner respectfully submits that the 90 day 
statute of limitations for the filing of a Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus is unreasonable and therefore, unconstitutional and 
should be struck down. 
DATED this _^ x day of 0 CT , 1992. 
STEPHEN CURRIER 
Attorney Pro Se 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 6 day of 
1992, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, four copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the following: 
David Bryant 
Assistant Attorney General 
Department of Corrections 
6100 South 300 East 
Murray, Utah 84107 
C^^^lt***^ 
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ADDENDUM A 
STEPHEN CURRIER 
Attorney Pro Se 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT,CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEPHEN CURRIER, * 
Petitioner, * PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
* HABEAS CORPUS AND POST 
vs. * CONVICTION RELIEF 
TAMARA HOLDEN, Warden, * Case No. 
Respondent. * Judge 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, STEPHEN CURRIER, pursuant to the 
following Rule of Civil Procedure: 
X Rule 65B(b) since claim is based on original commitment, or 
Rule 65B(b) since claim is based on parole violation, or 
Rule 65B(b) since claim is based on probation violation, or 
Rule 65B(c) since claim is based on parole grant hearing, 
and for cause of action alleges as follows: 
1. Petitioner is being illegally restrained at the following 
location: Utah State Prison, P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020. 
2. Petitioner was convicted and sentenced at the following 
Court: Seventh District Court, Carbon County, State of Utah. 
The dates of the proceedings in which the conviction (or Board of 
Pardons decision) was entered are as follows: April 3, 198-
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
The case number for these proceedings is: not known; X known 
and is case number 2434. 
3. In plain and concise terms, all of the facts on the basis 
of which the Petitioner claims a substantial violation of rights 
as the result of the commitment (or terms of parole) are as 
follows: 
a. That petitioner had ineffective assistance of 
counsel in that petitioner's counsel used undue and wrongful 
pressure to have petitioner enter into a plea agreement and plead 
guilty to the charges against the petitioner. (See P.2 of 
Transcripts on Motion to Change Plea) Petitioner's attorney stated 
that the plea agreement petitioner was entering into was that the 
sentence of one year invoked on petitioner would be suspended, and 
that petitioner would receive 1 year unsupervised probation and 
that the petitioner could leave the state unsupervised. Counsel 
continued to tell petitioner that this agreement was the best he 
could get and that if petitioner went to trial then petitioner was 
looking at a term of 1-15 at the Utah State Prison. (See Copies of 
Transcripts on Motion To Change Plea). Petitioner requested 
different counsel but his counsel told petitioner that he could not 
have another attorney handle his case because there wan one 
available to handle his case. Petitioner told counsel that he 
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
could not plead guilty to something he did not do. However, 
counsel kept repeating to petitioner that if he went to trial he 
would be sentenced to 1-15 years in prison. Petitioner finally had 
no choice but to accept the alleged plea agreement. 
b. Petitioner had no preliminary hearing. If 
petitioner signed a waiver of preliminary hearing, he did not know 
what it was he was signing. Counsel did not explain it to him. 
c. When the plea was submitted to the judge in open 
court the prosecutor said that no plea bargain agreement existed. 
d. Because the prosecutor denied the existence of a 
plea bargain, petitioner requested that his guilty plea be 
withdrawn approximately two minutes after it was entered. The 
Judge refused to allow petitioner to withdraw the guilty plea. 
e. That petitionees counsel had a conflict of interest 
in that petitioners counsel also represented Raymond C. Marquez 
in the case who made statements against the petitioner that 
effected the way the petitioner was defended. Petitioner was not 
aware of the conflict until after he had been sentenced. As a 
result of this conflict, petitioner's counsel was reluctant to try 
the case and adequately represent the petitioner. 
f. Because petitioner had no preliminary hearing, 
petitioner's counsel failed to enter evidence of two witnesses' 
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
statements at the preliminary hearing. Petitioner was accused of 
sexual abuse of a child and his counsel did not investigate the 
hospital records of the alleged victims as to whether they were 
negative or positive until Mr. Currier told him to. 
g. One of the witnesses that had given a statement to 
the police that petitioner had sex with both of the victims has now 
recanted his statement. (See Attached Affidavit of Raymond C. 
Marquez) 
h. Petitioner is in possession of another affidavit 
which states that the alleged victim denied any such assault by 
petitioner. (See Affidavit of Michael Stansfield) 
4. The judgment of conviction or the commitment for 
violation of probation or parole has been reviewed on appeal. 
_X_Yes The number and caption or title of the appellate 
proceeding and the results of the review are as follows: 
That petitioner's counsel filed an appeal with the Court 
of Appeals and then told petitioner to sign an plea agreement to 
drop the appeal and not sue anyone including himself, and his 
counsel would get him released from the Carbon County Jail. 
Petitioner signed, the appeal was dismissed and petitioner was 
released into probation. He was later violated for dirty urines. 
No It was not appealed because 
4 
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Question not applicable since this claim concerns a parole grant 
hearing for which there is no appeal or administrative remedy. 
5. The legality of the commitment for violation of probation 
or parole or the legality of the parole grant hearing has been 
reviewed on appeal. Yes X No If so, the reasons for the 
denial of relief in the prior proceeding are as follows: 
N/A 
6. Petitioner requests that he be appointed legal counsel 
based on the attached motion and affidavit of impecuniosity. 
7. The following documents are attached hereto and 
incorporated herein by reference (check all that apply): 
X Affidavits that support Petitioner's allegations 
_X Copies of records that support Petitioner's allegations, 
Other evidence that supports Petitioner's allegations 
X Copies of pleadings, orders and memoranda of the Court 
in any other post-conviction or civil proceeding that 
adjudicated the legality of Petitioner's commitment 
8. That pursuant to URCP Rules 65B(b)(12) and 54(d), 
Petitioner requests that this Court order the Respondent to obtain 
such transcripts of proceedings or court records which are relevant 
and material to this case and requests that the county in which he 
was originally charged be directed to pay the costs of the 
proceeding. (See attached motion and affidavit of impecuniosity). 
5 
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9. Due to the continuing nature of the illegal restraint, 
the statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann. §78-12-31.1 
does not bar this action. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court: 
1. Schedule an evidentiary hearing at which time Petitioner 
may be present and represented by counsel. 
2. Permit Petitioner, who remains indigent, to proceed 
without prepayment of costs, fees or other assessments. 
3. Grant Petitioner the authority to obtain subpoenas in 
Forma Pauperis, for witnesses and documents necessary to assist in 
the proof of the facts alleged in the petition as stated above. 
4. Issue an Order for Post Conviction Relief to have the 
Petitioner brought before it, to the end that he may be discharged 
from the illegal and unconstitutional confinement and restraint. 
Dated this day of , 1992. 
STEPHEN CURRIER 
Attorney Pro Se 
6 
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FILE COP! 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
DAVID F. BRYANT (5672) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
300 East 6100 South, Suite 204 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 265-5638 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEPHEN CURRIER, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
TAMARA HOLDEN, Warden, 
Respondent. 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 92-85 
Judge Boyd Bunnell 
Respondent, by and through her counsel, David F. Bryant, 
Assistant Attorney General, hereby moves this court to dismiss 
Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus because it is time-
barred and raises claims which could and should have been raised on 
appeal. . 
DATED this ^ay of April, 1992. 
DAVID F. BRYANT 
Assistant Attorney ^ General 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the £%> day of April, 1992, I 
caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing to 
Stephen Currier, pro se, P.O.Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020. 
tf*~f J?£AL 
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STEPHEN CURRIER 
Attorney Pro Se 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT, CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEPHEN CURRIER 
PETITIONER 
vs. 
TAMARA HOLDEN, WARDEN 
RESPONDENT 
OBJECTION 
Case No. 92-95 
Judge Boyd Bunnell 
Petitioner, Stephen Currier, Attorney Pro Se, hereinafter known as petitioner, with his objection, 
to respondents' "Motion to Dismiss," and states as follows: 
\n 
4> 1. Petitioner does have cognizable issues; 
2. In the interest of justice, petitioner believes that in this instant case, that, "Pro Se Habeas 
* 
t> Corpus petitions should be liberally construed," as stated in, Wallace vs. Lockhart. 701 F.2d. 719 (8th Cir. 
1982); 
.4 
w,5ro 
/ \ 3. Petitioner's petition should not be dismissed, as a dismissal is contrary to Utah Constitution, 
Article I, Section II, of which Utah Code Annotated, 78*12-31.1, attempts to supercede, which cannot 
Stand, as can be seen in, Micheal O. Smith vs. Gerald Cook. Warden. Utah Stats Prison: David R 
Wilkinson. Utah State Attorney General. Case No. 890241, filed November 29th, 1990, In THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH; of which also provides more than sufficient caselaw in 
support of the ruling. 
y 
n 
4. In further support to continue this action, to present for a hearing, to determine the facts, a bar ^ ^  *i;au* 
to dismissal is supported again, in the Utah Constitution, under Article I, Section 5,^ which simultaneously ^ 
with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65B (bl. gives further, and original jurisdiction, not to - / * / 
suspend the privilege of Writ of Habeas Corpus..., in the instant c a s ^ — *a< n*+~\ ^ U * A _ oMi^A- <-r , 
% 5. This court is bound under Article I, Section 3, of the Utah Constitution, in combination with 
^ Article VI, Section 2 of the United States Constitution. 
/ 6. Further, this court is bound by Article I, Section 9 (2), United States Constitution, whereby, 
^ The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended...," which supercedes Utah Code 
Ann. 78-12-31.1, that David F. Bryant, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Utah, should be well 
aware of. ^ , * 
7. Petitioner further claims protection, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Constitution, 0^\ 
In the interest of justice, in barring Respondents' Motion to Dismiss. jjc ***) 
8. Under, Bounds vs. Smith. 97 S. Ct, at 1491, "Prisoners have the constitutional right of access r r 
to the courts.", and even if Utah Code Annotated, Statute 78-12-31.1, is not superceded, Petitioner is \ r ^ 
being incarcerated on an ongoing basis, and it would be a travesty of justice to make an innocent man ^ c^\^V^h 
continue to be incarcerated because of the technicality of a (90) ninety day statute of limitations.* """ ^^^^J- * ^ 
9. Petitioner has been transferred, repeatedly, from one facility to another, making It impossible °^\^^ ^ 
to file within the time frame, which is supported by an affidavit from Wayne A. Freestone, Contract i \j*^ ^ 
Attorney, for the Department of Corrections, attached and incorporated with this objection. ^ ^ \~S "*^ 
10. Addressing the second point, in Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, in their memorandum, \j^ *~ 
Petitioners' Attorney did not file an interlocutory appeal and then advised Petitioner to dismiss the appeal. \ J L v****^ 
11. The dismissal, supra "10", was offered, under the Attorneys' advice as deal to get out of jail, £ J L $ **°^ 
under the provision that an agreement was signed. * 
12. The agreement, supra "11" was not to sue anyone, including the lawyer himself, and to 
dismiss the appeal. 
13.Petitioners' Attorney was unethically involved with a conflict of interest in coercing Petitioner to 
sign the above mentioned agreement, as the lawyer was personally involved in protecting himself from 
being sued. 
In the interest of justice, this court should investigate the circumstances of this instant action, 
take Petitioners' allegations as true, hold a hearing to determine the facts, and determine whether the 
plea bargain is valid-given to the entirety of circumstances, and also insure the protection of Petitioners' 
Constitutional Rights, under state and federal laws of this land. 
j j 
Dated this Z day of fT*hrC
 f 1992 
Stephen Currier 
-p-
I, Stephen Currier, Pro Se, Petitioner, hereby certify that on <5? day of. 
1992,1 caused to be mailed, a true and correct copy of the foregoing OBJECTION, to: 
Clerk of the Court-Carbon County 
149 East 100 South 
Price, Utah 84501 
R. Paul Van Dam (3312) 
Attoyney General 
David F. Bryant (5672) 
Assistant Attorney General 
State of Utah 
Attorneys' for Respondent 
300 East 6100 Soutrh, Suite 204 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Stephen Currier, Pro Se, 
Petitioner 
ADDENDUM D 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR CARB 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEPHEN CURRIER* 
Petitioner* 
TAMARA HOLD EN, Warden* 
Respondent. 
RULING ON RESPOND] 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 92-85 
The Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss this Petition on 
the ground that it was not timely filed in accordance with Section 
78-12-31.1 of the Utah Code. The Plaintiff has objected to the Motion 
and has requested oral arguments. 
From the file and the memorandum submitted* the Court finds 
that the Petition was not timely filed as required by the Rule* and 
that the Rule setting a time limitation on the filing of applications 
for writs of habeas corpus does not suspend the right under the 
Constitution* and that the Statute of Limitations as specified is not 
unconstitutional. 
The Court Further finds that the constitutional issue has been 
authoritatively analyzed and ruled upon and therefore* the Court will 
deny the application for oral arguments. 
THE COURT HEREBY grants the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that 
the Petition was not timely filed* and directs that the attorney for the 
Respondent prepare a formal order to that effect. _ ^ //)/7sn 
DATED this /2. day of June, 1992 . ^ O ^ / / 
—BOTD.^ JDNNEEt, "Districi-Jtjage 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I Mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing RULING ON RESPONDENTS MOTION TO DISMISS by depositing 
the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
David F. Bryant 
Assistant Attorney General 
300 East 6100 South, Suite 204 
Murray UT 84107 
Stephen Currier 
UTAH STATE PRISON 
Post Office Box 250 
Draper UT 84020 
DATED this /iL day of June, 1992 
Secretary 
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injunction may cause the party restrained or en-
joined; 
(3) The order or injunction, if issued, would not 
be adverse to the public interest; and 
(4) There is a substantial likelihood that the 
applicant will prevail on the merits of the under-
lying claim, or the case presents serious issues on 
the merits which should be the subject of further 
litigation. 
(0 Domestic relations cases. 
Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the 
uitable powers of the courts in domestic relations 
ses. 
mended effective September 1, 1991.) 
de 65B. Extraordinary relief. 
a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, 
3edy and adequate remedy is available, a person 
ly petition the court for extraordinary relief on any 
the grounds set forth in paragraph (b) (involving 
ongful imprisonment), paragraph (c) (involving 
ler types of wrongful restraint on personal liberty), 
ragraph (d) (involving the wrongful use of public or 
-porate authority) or paragraph (e) (involving the 
ongful use of judicial authority and the failure to 
grcise such authority). There shall be no special 
m of writ The procedures in this rule shall govern 
>ceedings on all petitions for extraordinary relief. 
the extent that this rule does not provide special 
>cedures, proceedings on petitions for extraordi-
ry relief shall be governed by the procedures set 
th elsewhere in these rules. 
b) Wrongful imprisonment. 
(1) Scope. Any person committed by a court to 
imprisonment in a state prison, other correc-
tional facility or county jail who asserts that the 
commitment resulted from a substantial denial 
of rights may petition the court for relief under 
this paragraph. This paragraph (b) shall govern 
proceedings based on claims relating to original 
commitments and commitments for violation of 
probation or parole. This paragraph (b) shall not 
govern proceedings based on claims relating to 
the terms or conditions of confinement. 
(2) Commencement. The proceeding shall be 
commenced by filing a petition, together with a 
copy thereof, with the clerk of the court in which 
the commitment leading to confinement was is-
sued, except that the court may order a change of 
venue on motion of a party for the convenience of 
the parties or witnesses. 
(3) Contents of the petition. The petition 
shall set forth all claims that the petitioner has 
in relation to the legality of the commitment. Ad-
ditional claims relating to the legality of the 
commitment may not be raised in subsequent 
proceedings except for good cause shown. The pe-
tition shall state: 
probation or parole has been reviewed on ap-
peal, and, if so, the number and caption or 
title of the appellate proceeding and the re-
sults of the review; 
(v) whether the legality of the commit-
ment has already been adjudicated in any 
prior post-conviction or other civil proceed-
ing, and if so the reasons for the denial of 
relief in the prior proceeding. 
(4) Attachments to the petition. The peti-
tioner shall attach to the petition affidavits, cop-
ies of records or other evidence available to the 
petitioner in support of the allegations. The peti-
tioner shall also attach to the petition a copy of 
the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior 
post-conviction or other civil proceeding that ad-
judicated the legality of the commitment, and a 
copy of all orders and memoranda of the court. If 
copies of pertinent pleadings, orders, and memo-
randa are not attached, the petition shall state 
why they are not attached. 
(5) Memorandum of authorities. The peti-
tioner shall not set forth argument or citations or 
discuss authorities in the petition, but these may 
be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies 
of which shall be filed with the petition. 
(6) Assignment by the presiding judge. On 
the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly 
deliver it to the presiding judge of the court in 
which it is filed. The presiding judge shall if pos-
sible assign the proceeding to the judge who is-
sued the commitment. 
(7) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review 
of the petition, if it is apparent to the court that 
the issues presented in the petition have already 
been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for 
any other reason any claim in the petition shall 
appear frivolous on its face, the court shall forth-
with issue an order dismissing the claim, stating 
that the claim is frivolous on its face. The order 
shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceed-
ings on the claim shall terminate with the entry 
of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal 
need not recite findings of fact or conclusions of 
law. 
(8) Service of petitions. If, on review of the 
petition, the court concludes that all or part of 
the petition is not frivolous on its face, the court 
shall designate the portions of the petition that 
are not frivolous and direct the clerk to serve a 
copy of the petition and a copy of any memoran-
dum by mail upon the attorney general and the 
county attorney. 
(9) Responsive pleading. Within twenty 
days (plus time allowed under these rules for ser-
vice by mail) after service of a copy of the petition 
upon the attorney general and county attorney, 
or within such other period of time as the court 
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tiall have the effect of removing a justice from office. 
„ chief justice shall be selected from among the jus-
ces of the Supreme Court as provided by statute, 
he chief justice may resign as chief justice without 
^signing from the Supreme Court. The Supreme 
ourt by rule may sit and render final judgment ei-
ler er banc or in divisions. The court shall not de-
lare any law unconstitutional under this constitu-
on or the Constitution of the United States, except 
Q the concurrence of a majority of all justices of the 
upreme Court. If a justice of the Supreme Court is 
isqualified or otherwise unable to participate in a 
ause before the court, the chief justice, or in the 
vent the chief justice is disqualified or unable to par-
cipate, the remaining justices, shall call an active 
idge from an appellate court or the district court to 
articipate in the cause. 1984 
ec. 3. [Jurisdiction of Supreme Court] 
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction 
) issue all extraordinary writs and to answer ques-
ons of state law certified by a court of the United 
tates. The Supreme Court shall have appellate juris-
iction over all other matters to be exercised as pro-
ided by statute, and power to issue all writs and 
rders necessary for the exercise of the Supreme 
lourt's jurisdiction or the complete determination of 
ny cause. 1984 
lee. 4. [Rule-making power of Supreme Court 
— Judges pro tempore — Regulation 
of practice of law.] 
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure 
nd evidence to be used in the courts of the state and 
hall by rule manage the appellate process. The Leg-
slature may amend the Rules of Procedure and Evi-
ence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote of 
wo-thirds of all members of both houses of the Legis-
ature. Except as otherwise provided by this constitu-
ion, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize re-
ired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to 
erform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall 
e citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and 
dmitted to practice law in Utah. The Supreme Court 
y rule shall govern the practice of law, including 
dmission to practice law and the conduct and disci-
dine of persons admitted to practice law. 1984 
5ec. 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other 
courts — Right of appeal.] 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in 
11 matters except as limited by this constitution or 
>y statute, and power to issue all extraordinary writs. 
Tie district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as 
irovided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other 
ourts, both original and appellate, shall be provided 
>y statute. Except for matters filed originally with 
he Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an 
ippeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction 
Sec. 7. [Qualifications of justices and judges.] 
Supreme Court justices shall be at least 30 years 
old, United States citizens, Utah residents for five 
years preceding selection, and admitted to practice 
law in Utah. Judges of other courts of record shall be 
at least 25 years old, United States citizens, Utah 
residents for three years preceding selection, and ad-
mitted to practice law in Utah. If geographic divi-
sions are provided for any court, judges of that court 
shall reside in the geographic division for which they 
are selected. 1984 
Sec. 8. [Vacancies — Nominating commissions 
— Senate approval.] 
When a vacancy occurs in a court of record, the 
governor shall fill the vacancy by appointment from a 
list of at least three nominees certified to the gover-
nor by the Judicial Nominating Commission having 
authority over the vacancy. The governor shall fill 
the vacancy within 30 days after receiving the list of 
nominees. If the governor fails to fill the vacancy 
within the time prescribed, the chief justice of the 
Supreme Court shall within 20 days make the ap-
pointment from the list of nominees. The Legislature 
by statute shall provide for the nominating commis-
sions' composition and procedures. No member of the 
Legislature may serve as a member of, nor may the 
Legislature appoint members to, any Judicial Nomi-
nating Commission. The Senate shall consider and 
render a decision on each judicial appointment within 
30 days of the date of appointment. If necessary, the 
Senate shall convene itself in extraordinary session 
for the purpose of considering judicial appointments. 
The appointment shall be effective upon approval of a 
majority of all members of the Senate. If the Senate 
fails to approve the appointment, the office shall be 
considered vacant and a new nominating process 
shall commence. Selection of judges shall be based 
solely upon consideration of fitness for office without 
regard to any partisan political considerations. 1984 
[Vacancies — Nominating commis-
sions — Senate approval.] [Proposed.] 
(1) When a vacancy occurs in a court of record, the 
governor shall fill the vacancy by appointment from a 
list of at least three nominees certified to the gover-
nor by the Judicial Nominating Commission having 
authority over the vacancy. The governor shall fill 
the vacancy within 30 days after receiving the list of 
nominees. If the governor fails to fill the vacancy^ 
within the time prescribed, the chief justice of the 
Supreme Court shall within 20 days make the ap-
pointment from the list of nominees. 
(2) The Legislature by statute shall provide for the 
nominating commissions' composition and proce-
dures. No member of the Legislature may serve as a 
member of, nor may the Legislature appoint members 
to, any Judicial Nominating Commission. 
(3) The Senate shall consider and render a decision 
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dertakmg in a criminal action, tor a torleiture or 
penalty to the state. 
(4) An action for libel, slander, assault, bat-
tery, false imprisonment, or seduction. 
(5) An action against a sheriff or other officer 
for the escape of a prisoner arrested or impris-
oned upon either civil or criminal process. 
(6) An action against a municipal corporation 
for damages or injuries to property caused by a 
mob or riot. 
(7) A claim for relief or a cause of action under 
the following sections of Title 25, Chapter 6, the 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: 
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), which in spe-
cific situations limits the time for action to 
four years, under Section 25-6-10; or 
(b) Subsection 25-6-6(2). 1989 
12-30. Actions on claims against county, city 
or town. 
Actions on claims against a county, city or incorpo-
ed town, which have been rejected by the board of 
mty commissioners, city commissioners, city coun-
or board of trustees, as the case may be, must be 
imenced within one year after the first rejection 
reof by such board of county or city commis-
ners. city council or board of trustees. 1953 
12-31. Within six months. 
Vithin six months: 
Ln action against an officer, or an officer de facto: 
(1) to recover any goods, wares, merchandise 
or other property seized by any such officer in his 
official capacity as tax collector, or to recover the 
price or value of any goods, wares, merchandise 
or other personal property so seized, or for dam-
ages for the seizure, detention, sale of, or injury 
to, any goods, wares, merchandise or other per-
sonal property seized, or for damages done to any 
person or property in making any such seizure. 
(2) for money paid to any such officer under 
protest, or seized by such officer in his official 
capacity, as a collector of taxes, and which, it is 
claimed, ought to be refunded. 1953 
12-31.1. Habeas corpus — Three months. 
Vithin three months: 
For relief pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus. 
This limitation shall apply not only as to grounds 
known to petitioner but also to grounds which in 
the exercise of reasonable diligence should have 
been known by petitioner or counsel for peti-
tioner. 1979 
12-31.2. Post-conviction remedies — 30 days. 
Mhin 30 days: 
No post-conviction remedies may be applied for 
or entertained by any court within 30 days prior 
to the date set for execution of a capital sentence, 
unless the grounds therefor are based on facts or 
The limitations in this article apply to actions 
brought in the name of or for the benefit of the state 
or other governmental entity, the same as to actions 
by private parties, except under Section 78-12-33.5. 
1988 
78-12-33.5. Statute of limitations — Asbestos 
damages — Action by state or govern-
mental entity. 
(1) (a) No statute of limitations or repose may bar 
an action by the state or other governmental en-
tity to recover damages from any manufacturer 
of any construction materials containing asbes-
tos, when the action arises out of the manufac-
turer's providing the materials, directly or 
though other persons, to the state or other gov-
ernmental entity or to a contractor on behalf of 
the state or other governmental entity. 
(b) Subsection (a) provides for actions not yet 
barred, and also acts retroactively to permit ac-
tions under this section that are otherwise 
barred. 
(2) As used in this section, "asbestos" means 
asbestiform varieties of: 
(a) chrysotile (serpentine); 
(b) crocidolite (riebeckite); 
(c) amosite (cummingtonite-grunerite); 
(d) anthophyllite; 
(e) tremolite; or 
(f) actinolite. 1988 
78-12-34. Repealed. 1981 
ARTICLE 3 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
78-12-35. Effect of absence from state. 
Where a cause of action accrues against a person 
when he is out of the state, the action may be com-
menced within the term as limited by this chapter 
after his return to the state. If after a cause of action 
accrues he departs from the state, the time of his 
absence is not part of the time limited for the com-
mencement of the action. 1987 
78-12-36. Effect of disability. 
If a person entitled to bring an action, other than 
for the recovery of real property, is at the time the 
cause of action accrued, either under the age of major-
ity or mentally incompetent and without a legal 
guardian, the time of the disability is not a part of the 
time limited for the commencement of the action. 
1987 
78-12-37. Effect of death. 
If a person entitled to bring an action dies before 
the expiration of the time limited for the commence-
ment thereof, and the cause of action survives, an 
action may be commenced by his representatives af-
ter the expiration of that time and within one year 
